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Abstract 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are often deployed in hostile 
environments, which make such networks highly vulnerable and 
increase the risk of attacks against this type of network. WSN 
comprise of large number of sensor nodes with different 
hardware abilities and functions. Due to the limited memory 
resources and energy constraints, complex security algorithms 
cannot be used in sensor networks. Therefore, it is necessary to 
balance between the security level and the associated energy 
consumption overhead to mitigate the security risks. Hierarchical 
routing protocol is more energy-efficient than other routing 
protocols in WSNs. Many secure cluster-based routing protocols 
have been proposed in the literature to overcome these 
constraints. In this paper, we discuss Secure Energy-Efficient 
Hierarchical Routing Protocols in WSNs and compare them in 
terms of security, performance and efficiency. Security issues for 
WSNs and their solutions are also discussed. 
Keywords: Wireless sensor network, Hierarchical routing 
protocol, Security. 
1. Introduction 
The tremendous development in the electronics technology 
lead the way to development of micro-electronics thus 
enabling production of small chips and micro devices. The 
communication technology is being reformed due the 
design and development of micro devices and hence 
enabled the design and development of WSNs with low 
cost, low energy consumption and high utilization. WSNs 
have lot of applications in military, health and other 
industrial sectors. Because of the characteristics of WSNs, 
sensor nodes are usually characterized by limited power, 
low bandwidth, memory size and limited energy [1]. 
 
Due to the scalability and energy efficiency characteristics, 
researchers proposed many routing protocols for cluster-
based WSNs [2]. In WSNs, routing protocols can be 
classified into two categories: Network Structure and 
Protocol Operation. Hierarchal routing protocol is one of 
the categories in their classification of WSN routing 
protocol based on the Network Structure. In cluster-based 
routing protocols, network is divided into cluster and each  
 
 
cluster has its own cluster head (CH). Further, CHs are 
responsible for relaying of messages from ordinary nodes 
to the Base Station (BS). CHs can communicate directly 
with the BS, can be anywhere in the network and change 
per interval, which also improves network’s energy 
efficiency [2]. 
 
Several enhanced secure hierarchal routing protocols have 
been proposed in literature [19, 21, 23, 24-28], to attempt 
to achieve both security and efficiency for WSNs. Most 
routing protocols are vulnerable to a number of security 
threats [3]. Attacks involving CHs are the most damaging. 
  
Due to the resource constraints of wireless sensors, public-
key based cryptographic algorithms like RSA and Diffie-
Hellman are too complicated and energy-consuming for 
WSNs. However the symmetric cryptographic technique 
has its own qualities that always make it more favourite as 
compared to public key cryptography for WSNs. 
Furthermore to provide security in WSN, encryption keys 
must be established among sensor nodes. Key distribution 
refers to the distribution of multiple keys among the sensor 
nodes. Key management also receives a great deal of 
attention in data encryption and authentication in WSNs 
security. 
 
Hence, it is necessary to well balance security level and the 
associated energy consumption overhead, to mitigate the 
security risks. Keys that are necessary for security and 
efficiency requirements of WSNs are listed in Table1. 
 
In this paper, we present an Advanced Survey on Secure 
Energy-Efficient Hierarchical Routing Protocol in WSNs. 
Security issues are discussed and their solutions presented. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes the Energy constraints in WSNs while Section III 
presents a review of energy-efficient hierarchical cluster 
routing protocols. Security requirements in WSNs are 
presented in Section IV. Section V discusses various 
attacks that can be launched on routing protocols in WSNs.  
 Table 1: Design requirement of energy-efficient security scheme 
S. 
No 
Requirement 
Type              Requirements 
1. Security Requirement 
Authentication 
Secrecy 
Integrity 
Resilience against node capture 
Resistance against node replication 
Compromised node revocation 
Fresh node addition 
2. Efficiency Requirement 
Energy efficiency 
Network connectivity 
Maximum supported network size 
Minimum memory storage 
Low computational overhead 
Low communication overhead 
 
Basic security mechanisms in WSNs are presented in 
section VI. In Section VII, secure hierarchical routing 
protocols in WSNs are discussed. Security analysis is 
presented in Section VIII and finally Section IX concludes 
our work. 
2. Energy constraints in WSNs 
The biggest constraint among the rest of the major 
constraints of a WSN is energy. In most cases the battery 
replacement is impossible. This means that the lifetime of a 
sensor depends greatly on the life of the battery. Fig. 1 
illustrates sensor node architecture with four major 
components and associated energy cost parameters [2]. 
Basically, energy consumption in sensor nodes can be 
classified into following three parts, as shown in Fig. 2. 
 
In WSNs, communication is more costly than computation 
[4] and many operations are energy intensive. It is for this 
reason that the current research focuses primarily on ways 
to reduce energy consumption. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  Major components and associated energy cost parameters of a 
sensor node. 
 
Fig. 2  Sensor nodes energy consumption. 
In WSNs, the security mechanisms (e.g., encryption, 
decryption, signing data, verifying signatures) are the main 
factors that influence power consumption by sensor nodes. 
Hence, adding security to WSNs also impose overhead to 
power consumption, the energy required to store security 
parameters and the energy required to transmit the security 
parameters. Limited energy prohibits the use of complex 
security mechanisms for message expansion. Furthermore, 
in WSNs security mechanism usually use more energy 
consumption for higher security levels. Thus, WSNs could 
be classified into different security levels following energy 
cost [5]. 
3. Energy-Efficient Hierarchical routing 
Algorithms in WSNs 
HWSNs is one of the main research areas in WSNs and 
behave the most energy-efficient among the rest of 
protocols for WSNs. Table 2 shows routing protocols 
classification in WSNs regarding to different categories.  
 
Many research projects during the last few years have 
explored cluster based routing protocols in WSNs from 
different perspectives. Most of them have been proposed 
for routing the correct data to the BS and prolonging the 
life of sensors node. Hence, each protocol has advantages 
and disadvantages. 
 
Table 2: Routing protocols classification in WSNs 
Routing 
Protocols 
in WSNs 
Network 
Structure 
Flat network routing  
Hierarchical 
Location Based-routing 
  Protocol     
Operation 
Negotiation-based routing 
Multipath-based routing 
Query-based routing 
QoS-based routing 
Coherent-based routing 
 3.1 Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy 
(LEACH). 
LEACH [2], first energy-efficient hierarchical routing 
protocol, is proposed for WSN using homogenous 
stationary nodes. In LEACH, Sensors nodes choose their 
leader based on some parameters such as the strongest 
signal received from a CH.  After certain interval, new 
nodes are selected as CH. LEACH reduces energy 
consumption by utilizing randomize rotation of CHs to 
evenly distribute the energy load in the network and 
turning off ordinary nodes when not required. 
3.2 Power-Efficient Gathering in Sensor Information 
Systems (PEGASIS) 
PEGASIS [6] is an extension of LEACH protocol. 
PEGASIS forms chains from sensors nodes. Sensors nodes  
 
transmit or receive data from a neighbor, in this way 
PEGASIS avoids cluster formation and uses only one node 
in a chain to transmit to the base-station. Therefore, 
increases the network lifetime. 
3.3 Hybrid Energy-Efficient Distributed Clustering 
(HEED). 
HEED [7] is an improvement of LEACH. HEED clustering 
randomly selects CHs and improves the lifetime of the 
network over LEACH clustering. 
3.4 Energy-Efficient Homogeneous Clustering 
Algorithm (EEHCA) for Wireless Sensor Networks 
In EEHCA [8], a new CH is selected based on the residual 
energy of existing CH, nearest hop distance of the node 
and holdback value. The uniform distribution of the cluster 
members extended the network lifetime. 
4. Security Requirements in WSNs 
To address the security issues in WSNs, we come across 
certain security requirements that must be addressed in 
WSNs environment. Here are some core security 
properties, implementation of which can contribute in 
development of more secure WSNs. 
4.1 Authentication 
It enables entities to cooperate within WSN without risk, 
by identifying and controlling participants in the network. 
It appears to be the cornerstone of a WSN. We cannot 
ensure confidentiality and the integrity of exchanged 
messages, if from the start we are not sure to communicate 
with the correct nodes. Therefore, it is essential for a 
receiver to have a mechanism to verify that the received 
packets have indeed come from the actual sender node. We 
can use Message Authentication Code (MAC) to ensure 
both the authentication of the origin of the message and 
integrity. An example of MAC is HMAC [9]. 
4.2 Data Integrity 
It ensures that no message can be altered by an entity as it 
traverses from the sender to the recipient. It can be ensured 
by the use of cryptographic hash functions, which require 
obtaining a fingerprint for each digital message. MD5 
function and Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1) [10] are 
some examples of most used hash functions. 
4.3 Data Confidentiality 
Once the message parts are authenticated, confidentiality 
remains an important point. It is to keep the secrecy of 
exchanged messages. The confidentiality can be ensured 
by the use of cryptography keys (i.e. symmetric or 
asymmetric). 
4.4 Availability 
It ensures that the services of a WSN should be always 
available even in the presence of an internal or external 
attack. A central access control system is used to ensure 
successful delivery of every message to its recipient. 
4.5 Data Freshness 
This service ensures that the data is up-to-date and ensures 
that no adversary can replay old messages. Data freshness 
is important when the WSN nodes use shared keys for 
message communication. The risk is that a potential 
adversary can launch a replay attack using the old key, as 
the new key is being refreshed and propagated to all the 
nodes in the WSN. A nonce or time-specific counter may 
be added to each packet to check the freshness of the 
packet. 
4.6 Self-organization 
In a WSN, each node should be self-organizing. This 
requirement of WSN also poses a great challenge to 
security. The dynamic nature of a WSN makes it 
sometimes impossible to deploy any preinstalled shared 
key mechanism among the sensors nodes and the BS [11].  
It is desirable that in WSNs, the nodes self-organize among 
themselves not only for multi-hop routing but also to 
carryout key management and developing trust relations. 
 5. Routing Attacks in WSNs 
The network layer of WSNs suffers from different types of 
attacks such as: (i) Sybil, (ii) sinkhole, (iii) hello flood, (iv) 
wormhole, (v) selective packet forwarding, etc. These 
attacks are described briefly. Table 3 illustrates the routing 
attacks on WSNs and some solutions to defeat them. 
5.1 Sybil Attack 
The attacker presents multiple identities on one node in the 
network. In this way, the attacker mostly affects the routing 
mechanism. Generally Sybil attacks are prevented by 
validation techniques. 
5.2 Sinkhole Attack 
In this type of attack, attacker presents himself in the 
network with high capability resources, by which 
announces a short path to destination to attract packets and 
then may drop them [12].  In this way, sinkhole attack 
gives birth to some attacks like blackhole, selective 
forwarding, etc. 
5.3 Hello Flood Attack 
Strong hello message broadcasted by attacker with high 
transmission power is to be received by every node in the 
network [12]. Other nodes may think this message is 
nearest to them and sends packets by this node. In this way, 
attack congestion occurs in the network. Hello flood 
attacks are prevented using blocking techniques. 
5.4 Wormhole Attack 
An adversary launch wormhole with tunneling mechanism  
Table 3: Routing attacks on WSNs and countermeasures 
Layer Attacks Solutions 
Network 
Spoofed routing 
information 
& selective forwarding 
Egress filtering, 
authentication, 
monitoring 
Hello Flood 
Authentication, packet 
leashes by using 
geographic 
and temporal info 
Wormhole Authentication, probing 
Sinkhole Redundancy checking 
Sybil 
Authentication, 
monitoring, 
redundancy 
to establish him between entities by confusing the routing 
protocol. Using out-of-bound channel to route packets, 
makes this kind of attack very difficult to detect. 
5.5 Selective Forwarding 
Generally two factors are important in this attack. The first 
is location of attacker as it will attract more traffic if the 
location of malicious node is close to base. The number of 
dropped messages is another factor, the more messages 
drops, the more energy it has in order to attack. An 
adversary can selectively forward some messages and 
drops others, therefore may compromise a node [12]. 
6. Basic Security Mechanisms in WSNs 
Security in sensor networks poses different challenges than 
conventional network, due to inherent resources and 
computing constraints. However, secure communications 
in some WSNs are critical. Two security aspects such as 
the area of cryptography and key management received a 
great deal of attention in WSNs. Cryptography and key 
management mechanisms for WSN security are presented 
below.  
6.1 Key Management 
Key management is the process in which keys are created, 
stored, protected, transferred, used between authorized 
parties and destroyed when they do not need [13]. Key 
management establishes the keys that are necessary to 
provide confidentiality, integrity and authentication 
services. Due to the limited memory resources and energy 
constraints of sensor nodes, complex security algorithms 
cannot be used in sensor networks. The main goal of key 
management in WSNs is to ensure security requirements of 
WSN by encrypting messages and authenticates the 
communicating nodes. Key management is quite 
challenging issue in WSNs and researchers presented a 
large number of approaches in literature due to the 
importance of key management in WSNs. Some 
researchers have investigated the WSNs key management 
schemes and divided them into different categories. 
 
From the work of Xiangqian and Makki [14], key 
management schemes in WSNs can be classified as 
following: key pre-distribution schemes, hybrid 
cryptography schemes, one-way hash schemes and key 
management in hierarchy networks. 
 
– Key Pre-Distribution Schemes: refers to how 
many keys are needed and how should the keys be 
distributed before the nodes are deployed? Key pre-
 distribution schemes can be classified as probabilistic 
schemes and deterministic schemes. 
 
In probabilistic scheme, the existence of a shared key 
between a particular pair of nodes is not certain and 
instead guaranteed only probabilistically. The basic idea of 
these schemes is to randomly preload each sensor with a 
subset of keys from a global key pool before deployment. 
So, these schemes can also be called Random Key Pre-
distribution (RKP). The first probabilistic key pre-
deployment scheme is introduced by Eschenauer and 
Gligor [11], which consists of three phases: key pre-
distribution, shared-key discovery, and path-key 
establishment. 
 
Contrary to probabilistic schemes, deterministic schemes 
guarantee that any two intermediate nodes can share one or 
more pre-distribution keys. 
 
LEAP [15] (Localized Encryption and Authentication 
Protocol), is a basic example of deterministic key 
management scheme. The authors of LEAP establish four 
types of keys that must be stored in each sensor to ease the 
overhead of key management and to provide secure 
communications in WSNs. 
– Hybrid Cryptography Schemes: use both 
asymmetric-key and symmetric-key cryptographs.  
– One-way Hash Schemes: is used in many 
approaches that come from one-way hash function 
technique to ease key management. 
– Key Management in Hierarchy Networks: many 
key management approaches are based on a normal flat 
structure. There are still some approaches that utilize a 
hierarchical structure in order to ease the difficulties by 
balancing the traffic among a BS, CHs, and sensors. These 
are the three parts of networks that have different resources. 
 
Zhang and Varadharajan [1] also considered three 
important factors for classification of key management 
schemes in WSNs based on the encryption techniques. 
These include symmetric, asymmetric and hybrid. Based 
on the key establishment mechanism, Zhang and 
Varadharajan [1] divided the symmetric and asymmetric 
schemes into eight and three subcategories respectively. 
This classification is shown in Fig. 3.  
 
– Most of the WSNs use the symmetric key 
schemes because these schemes requires less computation 
time than other schemes. Based on the key distribution, 
key discovery and key establishment in the schemes, 
symmetric schemes can be divided into six categories: 
entity based schemes, pure probabilistic-based schemes, 
polynomial-based key pre-distribution schemes, matrix-
based key pre-distribution schemes, tree-based key  
 
Fig. 3  Key management scheme in WSNs 
pre-distribution schemes and EBS-based key pre-
distribution schemes. 
 
– In asymmetric key management schemes, RSA 
and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are two major 
public key techniques. Public key technology is widely 
used in the security of Internet. On the other hand, some 
researchers believe that these techniques are too heavy-
weight for sensor networks because of requirement 
constraints. 
 
– In Hybrid schemes, several research groups [16] 
proposed the hybrid key establishment schemes for WSNs. 
The motivation is to exploit the difference among the BS, 
the CH and the sensor, and place the cryptographic burden 
on the BS or the sensors whose sources are less 
constrained. Sensors have limited computational power 
and energy resources, whereas BS has much more 
computational power and other resources. The hybrid key 
establishment schemes reduce the high computational cost 
on the sensors by placing them on the BS side. 
6.2 Cryptographic Mechanisms 
There are two types of cryptography techniques depending 
on the key. First is symmetric key cryptography that uses 
the same key for encryption and decryption (e.g., AES). 
Second is asymmetric key cryptography that uses different 
keys to encrypt and decrypt (e.g., RSA), requires more 
computation resources than symmetric key cryptography. 
Symmetric and Asymmetric encryption are illustrated in 
Fig. 4 (a) and (b) respectively. Due to the limited resources, 
public key cryptographic algorithms are not suitable for 
WSNs. However, the symmetric cryptographic technique 
has its own qualities that make it more favourable as 
compared to public key cryptography for WSNs. 
   
(a) Symmetric Encryption 
 
(b) Asymmetric Encryption 
Fig. 4 Types of cryptography 
For secure communication in WSNs, it is necessary to 
choose the most efficient cryptographic algorithm. A 
benchmark on cryptographic algorithms was presented by 
Law et al. [17] for WSNs. They focus on storage, energy-
efficiency and security properties of Skipjack, RC5, RC6, 
and Rijndael.  
 
In [17], the result of analysis show that in an environment 
where security is important, memory efficient 
cryptographic algorithm is required. And in an 
environment where availability of network is important, 
energy-efficient cryptographic algorithm has to be used. 
TinySec [18] provides Skipjack and RC5 as recommended 
cryptographic algorithm. Each algorithm has its own 
property, memory, energy efficiency and security. Table 4 
summarized the execution time of ECC, RSA, RC5 and 
Skipjack implemented on an Atmega128 processor. 
  
Table 4: Execution time of some cryptographic algorithms 
S. No Algorithms Operation Time 
1. RC5 0.38 ms 
2. Skipjack 0.26 ms 
3. ECC-160 810  ms 
4. RSA-1024 10990ms 
7. Secure Hierarchical Routing Protocols in 
WSNs 
Security in cluster based routing protocols is a particularly 
challenging task. Many works have been proposed to 
secure the hierarchical routing protocols. In this section, 
some approaches are reviewed and compared. Their 
advantages and disadvantages are also discussed.  
 
RLEACH [19] is a secure routing protocol for cluster-
based WSNs, using group key management, was proposed 
by Zhang et al. to solve the problem of secure LEACH. In 
this protocol, clusters are formed dynamically and 
periodically, can be thought as security extension of 
LEACH. RLEACH uses improve random pair-wise key 
management scheme (RPK), which use the one-way hash 
chain, symmetric and asymmetric cryptography to ensure 
security in LEACH. RLEACH resists to different attacks 
such as selective forwarding, sinkhole attacks, sybil attacks, 
and hello flood attack. Another advantage of RLEACH is 
that it is energy-efficient. In case, when a node transmit 
data to its CH, the member nodes among a cluster can 
close their wireless devices during the schedule creation 
phase or can sleep during the data transmission phase to 
save energy. Therefore, RLEACH balance the network 
security and the energy consumption in cluster-based 
WSNs. 
 
EECBKM [20] Energy-Efficient Cluster Based Key 
Management is a cluster based technique for key 
management in WSNs. In this protocol, initially the 
clusters are formed in the network and the CHs are 
selected based on the energy cost, coverage and processing 
capacity. An EBS key set is assigned by the sink to every 
CH and cluster key to every cluster. The EBS key set 
contains the pair-wise keys for intra-cluster and inter-
cluster communication. The data is made to pass through 
two phases of encryption during data transmission towards 
the sink. In this way security is ensured in the network. 
These keys are distributed to the nodes by the CH prior to 
communication. Secure channel is established between the 
nodes and the CH after the key distribution. Results have 
shown that this proposed technique reduces node-capture 
attacks and efficiently increases packet delivery ratio with 
reduced energy consumption. 
 
SHEER [21] is a secure hierarchical energy-efficient 
routing protocol proposed by Ibriq and Mahgoub, which 
provides energy-efficient and secure communication on the 
network layer. For key distribution and authentication, 
securing the routing mechanism, SHEER uses HIKES 
(Hierarchical Key Establishment System) and also 
implements a probabilistic transmission mechanism to 
improve the network energy performance and lifetime. 
 SHEER defends the network against hello flood attack, 
sybil attack. The sinkhole attack will also fail because the 
attacker does not possess all keys, required for 
authentication. SHEER fail to protect the network from 
selective forwarding attacks. 
 
SecLEACH [22] is a protocol for securing node-to-node 
communication in LEACH-based networks. Using random 
key pre-distribution, SecLEACH provides security in 
LEACH, introduced symmetric key and one-way hash 
chain to provide different performance numbers on 
efficiency and security depending on its various parameter 
values. 
 
SecLEACH is an improvement of SLEACH [23], the first 
study in homogeneous WSNs focused on adding security 
to cluster-based communication protocols with resource 
constrained sensor nodes. SecLEACH provides 
authenticity, confidentiality, integrity and freshness for 
node-to-node communication. Otherwise SecLEACH is 
vulnerable to key collision attacks and do not provide full 
connectivity. The overheads in SecLEACH were computed 
using the number of CH value in the network which 
decrease the total energy consumption, and prolong the 
network’s lifetime. 
 
SS-LEACH [24] is a protocol based on LEACH protocol, 
considering routing security and network lifetime. 
Improving the method for electing CHs, the SS-LEACH 
protocol forms dynamic stochastic multipath CHs chains 
using nodes self-location technology and key pre-
distribution strategy. So the SS-LEACH protocol strongly 
improves the energy-efficiency and hence prolongs the 
lifetime of the network. The SS-LEACH protocol can 
prevent compromised node and preserve the secrecy of the 
packet. It also can avoid sybil attack, selective forwarding 
and hello flooding. 
 
NSKM [25], a Novel Secure Key Management module for 
Hierarchical Clustering WSNs provides an efficient 
scalable post-distribution key establishment that allows the 
hierarchical clustering topology platform to provide 
acceptable security services. In NSKM, there are three 
categories of keys; pre-deployed keys, network generated 
keys and the BS broadcasted keys. This module is the first 
implemented security module for WSNs that provides 
reasonable resistance against replay and node capture 
attacks.  This work couples hierarchical clustering based 
routing with NSKM module. The selection of SCH among 
CHs is based on its location and its distance to BS. Most of 
communication types in WSNs have unique features of this 
work, using in-network keys generation and blending. The 
NSKM module is energy-efficient, has strong flexibility 
against susceptible attacks on WSNs, keeping the resource 
starved nature of sensor nodes. NSKM also ensures that 
the whole network is never compromised even if there has 
been an attack in the network. Furthermore, it is highly 
lightweight and scalable and is acceptable to be used in 
large WSNs. 
 
AKM [26] is an Authenticated Key Management scheme 
for hierarchical networks based on the random key pre-
distribution. Security is provided by using two kinds of 
keys, a pair-wise shared key between nodes, and a network 
key. To divide nodes into clusters, AKM scheme use an 
existing ring structure energy-efficient clustering 
architecture (RECA). Using more than one encryption key, 
AKM provides multiple level of encryption, secure cluster 
formation algorithm and avoid node captures. AKM 
provides confidentiality, global and continuous 
authentication of nodes in the network by periodically 
refreshing the network key. In general AKM scheme can 
be applied for different energy-efficient data dissemination 
techniques for sensors networks. However, if adversary re-
enters the compromised node into the network before 
refreshing the current network key, the resiliency of AMK 
scheme will be same as given in Eschenauer et al. [11]. 
 
SRPSN [27] is a Secure Routing Protocol for Sensor 
Networks consists of a hierarchical network with CHs and 
cluster member nodes. CHs route the messages from 
sensor nodes. A preloaded symmetric key is shared 
between all CHs and the BS to protect data. SRPSN is also 
designed to safeguard the data packet transmission on the 
sensor networks under different types of attacks. A group 
key management scheme is proposed, which contains 
group communication policies, group membership 
requirements and an algorithm for generating a distributed 
group key for secure communication. Every sensor node 
contributes its partial key for computing the group key.  
One drawback associated with this protocol is that there is 
no authentication in the mechanism.  Hence, SRPSN fail to 
protect against attacks like spoofing, altering, replaying. If 
the adversary uses the sybil attack, the problem will be 
more severe. The malicious node can also become a 
sinkhole. Another problem of this scheme is that children 
nodes will select a largest NBR node to relay data. 
However, energy consumption will be increased in this 
case. 
 
SecRout [28], a Secure Routing Protocol for sensor 
networks is proposed by Yin and Madria to provide 
security against attack from compromised nodes in sensor 
networks. SecRout can detect if packets are dropped or 
modified by malicious nodes. In the SecRout protocol, 
only high efficient symmetric cryptography is used to 
secure messages, and the partial routing path is recorded in 
sensor nodes memory. Further, SecRout uses two types of 
 keys: the master shared key used between the sink and 
CHs, and the cluster key among the clusters to encrypt the 
message. In SecRout all messages will be verified through 
MAC. It ensures that the messages received are not 
tampered, hence guarantees freshness. In SecRout, two- 
level architecture can greatly lower the message overhead. 
Therefore, SecRout can greatly save the energy, and 
decrease the usage of memory and bandwidth. 
 
IKDM [29] is an Improved Key Distribution Mechanism, 
based on hierarchical network architecture and bivariate 
polynomial-key pre-distribution mechanism. In IKDM, 
each sensor has a unique id in the network. An offline Key 
Distribution Server (KDS) first initializes sensors before 
deployment by giving each sensor node a polynomial 
share. In order to setup a pair-wise key between two sensor 
nodes, they exchange their node ids first, and then nodes 
evaluate their stored polynomial. Since, sensors nodes can 
obtain the same value from the two distinct calculations, 
which can be used as their pair-wise communication key. 
Note that in IKDM, two communicating parties can 
establish a unique pair-wise key between them. IKDM 
scheme can achieve better network resilience against node 
capture attack, hence can provide efficient security and is 
not affected by the number of compromised sensors. 
IKDM scheme provides better scalability, network 
throughput, fixed key storage overhead, full network 
connectivity and is suitable for large-scale WSNs. 
Therefore IKDM scheme is more energy-efficient due to 
the lower communication overhead for sensor nodes during 
the pair-wise key establishment process. 
8. Security Analysis 
We describe some secure hierarchical routing protocols 
selected based on security mechanisms, security 
requirements, various routing attacks and performance 
metrics. 
 
Security requirements for several routing protocols are 
summarized in Table 5. We observe that SecLEACH, 
SHEER, EECBKM, AKM, IKDM and NSKM address all 
the listed security requirements (authenticity, 
confidentiality, freshness and integrity) thus they are more 
secure than rest of the protocols if the security 
requirements is taken as criteria. According to the security 
requirements, selected protocols classification show that 
authentication and integrity are the most satisfied. 
 
An overview of routing attacks in WSNs is shown in Table 
6. From the table, it is clear that certain schemes defeats or 
mitigate the effect of various routing attacks. Considering 
the resistance against the routing attacks, Table 6 shows 
Table 5: Security requirements for secure hierarchical routing protocols 
Secure 
Hierarchical 
Routing 
Protocol 
Security Requirements 
Authenticity Confid-
entiality Integrity Freshness 
RLEACH Yes  Yes  
EECBKM Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SHEER Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SLEACH Yes  Yes  
SecLEACH Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SS-LEACH Yes Yes   
NSKM Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AKM Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SRPSN Yes Yes Yes  
SecRout Yes  Yes  
IKDM Yes Yes Yes Yes 
‘Yes’ means that protocol can achieve that security requirement. 
Table 6: Resistance of routing attacks for secure hierarchical routing 
protocols 
Secure 
Hierarchic
al Routing 
Protocol 
Routing Attacks in WSNs 
Selective 
Forwarding 
Sink-
hole 
Worm-
hole Sybil 
Hello 
Flood 
Node 
Capture  
RLEACH Yes M  Yes Yes  
EECBKM  M  Yes Yes Yes 
SHEER Yes M  Yes Yes  
SLEACH Yes M   Yes  
SecLEACH Yes   Yes Yes  
SS-LEACH Yes   Yes Yes M 
NSKM Yes M M Yes Yes Yes 
AKM Yes Yes M Yes Yes Yes 
SRPSN Yes      
SecRout Yes M  M  Yes 
IKDM Yes M M Yes Yes Yes 
‘Yes’ means that protocol defeats the attack and ‘M’  means that 
protocol mitigates the effect of attack based on our pre-evaluation.  
 
that RLEACH, NSKM, EECBKM, AKM, SecRout, and 
IKDM are more resistant to routing attacks than rest of the 
secure protocols. 
 
The detailed comparison results are summarized in Table 7. 
We observe that energy efficiency depends strictly on the 
communication overhead. Therefore, all schemes with 
lower communication overhead achieve energy efficiency 
(e.g. IKDM, SHEER, SS-LEACH, etc.). This is due to the 
fact that communications consume much more energies 
than the code execution or computation in WSNs. We also 
remark that approaches based on probabilistic key 
distribution (e.g. SLEACH, Sec-LEACH, etc.) are less
 Table 7: Comparison summary based on security mechanisms, performance and efficiency of some selected secure hierarchical routing protocols 
implemented for WSNs. 
 
energy-efficient than other schemes (e.g. IKDM based on 
deterministic approaches).  Due to the fact that approaches 
based on probabilistic key distribution generate a lot of 
messages, require much more memory space. In contrast, 
the determinist ic  key distr ibution requires more  
 
 
computation time for nodes.  Note that in WSNs, 
computation consumes less energy compared to the 
exchange of messages between sensor nodes.  Considering 
the scalability, Table 7 also shows that probabilistic 
approaches are less scalable than other schemes. 
Protocol 
Name 
A Comparative Overview Of Representative Secure Hierarchical Routing Protocols For WSNs 
Ref Cryptography 
Scheme 
Key distribution and 
Management 
Scheme 
Authentication 
Scheme 
Storage 
Load 
Comm. 
Load 
Scalab-
ility 
Robust-
ness 
Connectivity 
Energy 
Efficiency 
RLEACH [19] 
Symmetric 
key 
cryptography 
Improved Random 
pair-wise key 
management 
(IRPK) 
Authentication 
is achieved via 
IRPK 
High Medium Good Good Probabilistic Medium 
EECBKM [20]  
EBS-based key 
Management 
schemes 
Via Key 
Management Low Low Medium Good 100% Good 
SHEER [21] 
Symmetric 
key 
cryptography 
Hierarchical key 
management and 
authentication 
scheme 
Authentication 
is achieved via 
HIKES 
Medium Low Good Good 100% Good 
SLEACH [23] 
Symmetric 
key 
cryptography 
 MAC High Medium Medium Limited Probabilistic Medium 
Sec-LEACH [22] 
Symmetric 
key 
cryptography 
Random key pre-
distribution scheme 
Don't provide 
broadcasts 
authentication 
High Medium Medium Limited Probabilistic Medium 
SS-LEACH [24] 
Symmetric 
key 
cryptography 
Keys pre-
distribution 
strategy 
 Medium Low Medium Limited 100% Good 
NSKM [25]  Key management 
schemes based MAC Low Low Good Good 100% Good 
     AKM [26]  
Random Pre-
distribution Key 
Management  
Via Key 
Management 
and MAC 
High Medium Good Good Probabilistic Medium 
  SRPSN [27] 
Symmetric 
key 
cryptography 
Group key 
management 
scheme 
MAC Medium Low Medium Low 100% Good 
  SecRout [28] 
Symmetric 
key 
cryptography 
The Scheme 
introduced in 
LEAP  [15] 
MAC Low Low Good Limited 100% Good 
    IKDM [29]  
Bivariate 
polynomial-key 
pre-distribution 
mechanism 
Via  
polynomial    
key  pre-
distribution               
mechanism 
Low Low High Good 100% Good 
 There exist some surveys on secure hierarchical WSNs 
[30]. However none of them address the energy 
consumption constraints following the security 
mechanisms. 
 
Based on hierarchical topology, Sharma and Jena [30] 
consider that all selected works are energy efficiency.  
However, they do not pay much attention on energy 
constraints when different security mechanisms are used. 
This is very crucial because technique based probabilistic 
and deterministic don't have the same impact on energy 
consumption. In addition, Sharma and Jena [30] did not 
address the performance requirements study (e.g. memory 
overhead, computation overhead etc.), which is more 
important because it is strictly bound to the energy 
consumed. 
 
In the paper, we presented an overview of well-known 
routing protocols for WSNs and a technical overview of 
each protocol. We also provide a comprehensive and 
informative comparison of them, which we believe is a 
significant improvement, when compared to other 
comparative studies in WSNs. 
4. Conclusions and Future Research 
The main goal of a routing protocol design is to provide 
energy efficiency and extend network lifetime. Sensor 
nodes are susceptible to a number of routing attacks 
depending on the nature of the WSNs, the limited memory 
resources and energy constraints. In order to provide 
security in WSNs and mitigate the security threats to 
routing protocols, secure routing protocols to be used. In 
this paper, we reviewed and analysed some secure cluster-
based routing protocols. The comparative study show that 
some selected schemes can well balance between security 
level and the associated energy consumption overhead. An 
informative overview of protocols is given and their 
advantages and disadvantages listed. We also presented 
detailed comparison based upon various criteria in the 
analysis section. Further, research would be needed to 
address issues related to secure routing under the mobility 
for resource constrained WSN. The study may help to 
orient the development of future proposals well adapted in 
the area of security issues in routing protocols for WSNs. 
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